















    
  
 
     
   
   
“Religion” as a Bundle of Legal Proxies: 
Reply to Micah Schwartzman 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN* 
The debate among legal scholars about whether religion is special is
chronically confused by the scholars’ failure to grasp a point familiar in 
the academic study of religion: “religion” is a label for something that 
has no ontological reality.1 Religion has no essence.  If it has a determinate
meaning, it is simply because there is a settled and familiar practice of
applying the label of religion in predictable ways.2 
The question of religious accommodation arises in cases where a law 
can allow some exceptions. Many laws, such as military conscription, 
taxes, environmental regulations, and antidiscrimination laws, will 
accomplish their ends even if there is some deviation from the norm they
set forth, so long as that deviation does not become too great. In such
cases, special treatment is sometimes appropriate.3  Religious exemption 
is the practice of singling out religion as a basis for such special treatment.
Since there is no such thing as religion, if such accommodations are
justified, the justification must ultimately depend on some desideratum 
other than religion.  Religion can only be a proxy.
* © 2014 Andrew Koppelman. John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and 
Professor of Political Science, Department of Philosophy Affiliated Faculty, Northwestern
University. 
1. This is not a theological claim. The proposition that the Christian God exists
outside the human imagination, for instance, does not entail that religion, encompassing 
everything connoted by that word, is an entity that exists outside the human imagination.
2. See  ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 7– 
8, 43–45 (2013). 







    
 














   




Why does anyone think that religious activity is a worthwhile way to
spend one’s time?  The answers that have traditionally been given point 
to multiple goods, including 
salvation (if you think you need to be saved), harmony with the transcendent 
origin of universal order (if it exists), responding to the fundamentally imperfect 
character of human life (if it is imperfect), courage in the face of the heartbreaking
aspects of human existence (if that kind of encouragement helps), a transcendent
underpinning for the resolution to act morally (if that kind of underpinning
helps), contact with that which is awesome and indescribable (if awe is something
you feel), and many others.4 
In the cottage industry of proposals to discard the category of religion 
and substitute something else, these goods have not gotten much attention 
for the excellent reason that they are theologically loaded.  It is not just 
that they are narrower and more specific than religion.  Their goodness 
depends on contestable metaphysical premises.  Secular liberal philosophers
tend to shy away from such notions.  When most people outside the
academy deem religion valuable, on the other hand, these are the sorts
of considerations they have in mind.  There are a lot of religious people 
out there. Religious accommodations are sometimes supported by religious
reasons.
Different religions conceive these goods differently. That has political
implications.  “The fact that there is so much contestation among religions
as to which of these goods is most salient is itself a reason for the state to 
remain vague about this question.”5  Privileging any one of them would
discriminate among religions.  The scholars who seek substitutes for 
religion, who tend to be neutralitarian liberals,6 instinctively shrink from 
doing that.  American law, however, is not neutralitarian.  Its neutrality
is specifically neutrality among religions.7  A major reason for using 
religion as a proxy for specific ends, such as salvation, is that if the good 
the state pursues is described in this vague way, the state need not assess
the comparative value of those ends.  There is also, of course, disagreement
about which religions actually achieve these goods.  If the pertinent good 
4. KOPPELMAN, supra note 2, at 124 (footnotes omitted). 
5. Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV.
DIALOGUE 71, 78 (2013), lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/
Dialogue/Koppelman%20Online.pdf.
6. That is, liberals who claim that the law should be neutral among all contested
conceptions of the good.  Schwartzman is attracted to this position. 
7. See generally  KOPPELMAN, supra note 2 (arguing that American neutrality 
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is salvation, for instance, then the state should figure out which religion 
actually delivers it.8  The broad category of religion evades that task. 
Then, of course, there are the substitutes that have been offered as 
possible legal criteria for accommodation: “individual autonomy, a source 
of meaning inaccessible to other people, psychologically urgent needs
(treating religion as analogous to a disability that needs accommodation),
comprehensive views, and conscience.”9 All are underinclusive.10  If you 
substitute any of them for religion, you will not capture settled intuitions 
about accommodation.11  There are lots of good reasons for accommodation.
Neglecting any of them is unfair.  Religion is not just a proxy for something 
else. It is a proxy for many something elses.  It is a bundle of proxies. 
Micah Schwartzman argues that the law “can and should provide 
significant protections for both” religion and conscience.12  He is  right  
that the law sometimes does this. When it does, accommodation looks
like this: 
Religion Conscience 
8. See Larry Alexander, Good God, Garvey! The Inevitability and Impossibility
of a Religious Justification of Free Exercise Exemptions, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 35, 42–43
(1998).
9. Koppelman, supra note 5, at 75 (citing KOPPELMAN, supra note 2, at 131–44).
10. Schwartzman is right that underinclusiveness matters more than overinclusiveness 
because the latter can be handled appropriately by the compelling interest test.
11. See Koppelman, supra note 5, at 75–77. 
12. Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085, 









   
















   
  
  
    
 
Here, of course, religion persists as a basis for special protection.13 
I never have said that religion is the only legitimate basis for 
accommodation, nor that conscience, as such, should never be
accommodated.14 “Because no single legal rule can protect all deeply
valuable concerns, more specific rules are necessary.  Accommodation 
of religion is one of these.”15  Some legitimate bases for accommodation 
have nothing to do with religion, such as a parent’s obligations to his
children. 
To the extent that religion can be identified with multiple goods—if 
religion is a proxy for them—then to the extent that it is possible, without 
discriminating among religions, to bypass religion and directly identify
each of these goods and accommodate it as such, we ought to do so.  The 
point is not unique to conscience.  It is true of the full range of goods
associated with religion. We would then have a complex set of
accommodations.  I will not attempt to draw the Venn diagram here.
Imagine a cluster of partially overlapping circles containing each of the
specifications I have described here: conscience, autonomy, comprehensive
views, et cetera.16  Each represents claims for accommodation weighty 
enough that it would be unfair to ignore them.  Some of these, however,
will be so theologically loaded that the state ought to avoid discussing 
their specific bases, for reasons I have already discussed. Others will 
simply not be administrable, such as Eisgruber and Sager’s “deep”
commitments.17 
In some cases, no proxy is needed.  It is misleading to focus exclusively 
on such cases, such as Schwartzman’s example of the doctor who feels
conscientiously compelled to abort a pregnancy that threatens the mother’s
13. Schwartzman thinks that religion may be a wholly contained subset of 
conscience, even in the accommodation cases I cite that have no obvious connection to 
conscience.  See id. at 1100–02. He does not, however, develop this argument. 
14. I acknowledge the possibility of using conscience as a separate category. See 
KOPPELMAN, supra note 2, at 142.  I elaborate the point elsewhere:
It is indeed valuable whenever people decide to act morally, and this form of 
volitional necessity may therefore be especially eligible for accommodation. 
A well-functioning human being is disposed to heed her conscience, and this
disposition is damaged whenever she succumbs to pressure to violate her
conscience.  That may sometimes be a reason to accommodate conscience as
such. 
Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, 15 
LEGAL THEORY 215, 240 (2009). 
15. KOPPELMAN, supra note 2, at 165. 
16. The pattern of overlap among these terms is so complex that a two-
dimensional Venn diagram probably could not represent it. 
17. Eisgruber and Sager use that term repeatedly to describe the claims that should be
treated equally with religious ones.  See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER,
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life. Because it was so easy to identify the nonreligious value being 
promoted (here, conscience), you can be tempted to say that we should
always just do that: focus on that value and ignore religion.18  If you pull
the camera back to the whole range of accommodation cases, the difficulties
come back into the field of vision. 
Schwartzman is right that my argument “is not sufficient to establish 
that no other proxy can serve as a global substitute.”19  Nor can I show 
that no other proxy can serve as a global substitute for the present written 
exam and road test with which the state tries to detect safe drivers.  It is 
hard to prove a negative.  Perhaps someday we will be able to dispense 
with these imperfect mechanisms.  In order to answer this conference’s 
question—whether religion is outdated as a constitutional category—we 
need to locate ourselves in historical time. 
Proxies, being imperfect, are always subject to adjustment for the sake
of greater precision.  Driver exams can be tweaked.  Tweaking, however, 
has its limits.  Schwartzman is correct that “when proxies are used to 
determine the scope of basic rights and liberties, we are generally more
suspicious of significant over-and-under-inclusiveness.”20  But that suspicion 
cannot rule out imperfect proxies altogether, and even supplemental proxies 
cannot eliminate over- and under-inclusiveness.  Criminal punishment is 
a matter of basic rights and liberties if anything is, but we do not punish 
people who have committed crimes, relying instead on the proxy of people
who have been convicted of crimes. The supplemental proxy of post-
conviction review rescues some, but not all, innocent people who have 
been wrongly convicted.  No matter what we do, if we are going to have 
criminal punishment at all, it will sometimes make mistakes.  That does 
not mean that the pertinent proxies may not be used.  Schwartzman’s 
proposed supplement similarly will diminish, but not eliminate, the law’s 
imperfection. 
18. The same exercise is often undertaken with the Seeger and Welsh cases, 
which, because they are the focal cases in every religious liberty casebook, have an 
anchoring effect.  See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (plurality opinion)
(allowing exemption from participation in war for anyone “whose conscience[], spurred
by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace”); 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (same). 
19. Schwartzman, supra note 12, at 1099.  Here, unlike the rest of his article, 
Schwartzman implies that religion should not merely be supplemented by conscience but 
also be discarded altogether as a category.






    
 
   
 















   
  
 
   
Schwartzman implicitly admits this when he proposes a supplemental
proxy, rather than demanding that proxies be abandoned altogether.  So
in the end, we are not in fundamental disagreement.  There are many today 
who think that the law should never single out religion for special treatment 
and that such special treatment itself is an unconstitutional establishment 
of religion.21 Brian Leiter states the position incisively when he claims
that religion could legitimately be singled out for special protection only 
because of “features that all and only religious beliefs have, either as a 
matter of (conceptual or other) necessity or as a contingent matter of fact,” 
or features that would not merit such principled toleration if other beliefs 
have those same features.22 Schwartzman and I both reject that position.
The category of religion in American law has changed its denotation 
over time.23  Its inherent imprecision and its deployment as a proxy respond 
to conditions of religious diversity that appear to be permanent conditions of
modernity.  That is why America’s analytically imprecise response to that 
diversity should be of interest in other regimes where the same conditions 
apply—which is to say, everywhere.  Religion cannot be dispensed with 
without producing the kind of unfairness that Schwartzman admirably 
worries about. 
21. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536–37 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting that a statute mandating accommodation gives the church a benefit 
“that no atheist or agnostic can obtain.  This governmental preference for religion, as 
opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment” (citation omitted)); PHILIP 
B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW: OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 
17 (1962) (“For if the command is that inhibitions not be placed by the state on religious 
activity, it is equally forbidden the state to confer favors upon religious activity.”); 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of
Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 556 (1998) (arguing that 
various justifications for religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause are no 
longer plausible); Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the
Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 75, 78 (1990) (arguing that the “accommodation principle” has “no place in 
either establishment or free exercise clause jurisprudence”); Philip B. Kurland, The
Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the 
Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 24 (1979) (“The freedom and separation clauses 
should be read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a 
standard for action or inaction . . . .” (quoting Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State 
and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961))). 
22. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 27 (2013).  Leiter is correct that no 
such features exist.  He acknowledges the indispensability of legal proxies but does not 
examine the impact of that concession on his thesis that singling out religion is unfair. 
See id. at 94–99. 
23. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 2, at 26–45. 
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